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Sexual harassment can be conceptualised as an interaction between harassers and targets. Utilising 
23 detailed legal transcripts, this study explored evidence of a range of perpetrator tactics and 
target counter-tactics. These tactics can be readily fitted into the backfire framework, which 
proposes that powerful perpetrators of perceived unjust acts are likely to cover up the actions, 
devalue the target, reinterpret the events, use official channels to give an appearance of justice, and 
intimidate or bribe people involved. Targets can respond using counter-tactics of exposure, 
validation, reframing, mobilisation of support, and resistance. The findings have implications for 




Sexual harassment (SH) remains a serious problem in many workplaces, despite decades of 
effort to eradicate it. SH refers to a range of behaviours including staring, sexual comments, 
displaying sexual images, touching, grabbing and seeking sexual favours. It is distinguished 
from so-called ‘normal’ sexual attraction by being unsolicited, unwelcome and 
unreciprocated. Most SH is by men against women, with a small proportion of female-to-male 
and same-sex harassment (Firestone & Harris 2003; HREOC 2004; Samuels 2003). 
The phenomenon evolved from a radical feminist concern in a grassroots movement, to a 
formal acknowledgement as a social problem in the 1970s when vocal feminists such as 
Catherine MacKinnon gave voice to its endemic nature and, supported by empirical research 
that demonstrated millions of women suffer sexual harassment in their working lives, forced 
the issue into the public light (MacKinnon 1979; Zippel 2006). This recognition has translated 
to contemporary laws and practices in different cultural, legal and political contexts around 
the world (Zippel 2006). However, institutional, community and organizational responses 
have worked only in limited ways in raising awareness of and reducing the extent of the 
problem. Sexual harassment remains endemic in organisations and the individual and 
organisational costs of the problem remain profound. 
Like other forms of sexual violence which are under-reported (Allen 2007), targets of SH 
often do not make formal complaints through organisational procedures or to outside bodies 
(Firestone & Harris 2003; HREOC 2004; URCOT 2005). Rather, most targets deal with the 
problem in isolation or with the assistance of friends or co-workers, or by tolerating the 
behaviours, leaving the organisation or resisting in other informal ways. Hence, it is 
surprising how little attention has been given to methods of resistance. The limitations of 
statutory protections from sexual harassment and the de-contextualisation and 
individualisation of discrimination complaints (Easteal & Feerick 2005) also suggest that 
individual responses are a vital component of anti-harassment strategies. In terms of practical 
responses, the major contribution to the literature is Langelan’s 1993 book Back Off!  
Underpinned by women’s self-defence theory, it examines women’s resistance of male abuse 
and highlights effective methods of doing so. 
We sought to analyse systematically the tactics used by harassers and by those subject to 
harassment. Social science has given little attention to tactics and strategy (Jasper 2006, xii). 
We therefore turned to a recently developed framework called the backfire model, which has 
been used for classifying tactics used by perpetrators of perceived injustice. The framework 
has been applied to a range of case studies, including censorship (Jansen & Martin 2004), 
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defamation (Gray & Martin 2006) and corporate disasters (Engel & Martin 2006). In the next 
section, we outline the backfire model and describe how it can be applied to SH. In the 
following sections we analyse 23 SH cases using the five categories of tactics used by 
harassers and five counter-tactics by those harassed. We conclude with an assessment of the 
approach, arguing that individual responses, alongside organisational and institutional ones, 
are likely to be a vital component of the range of strategies that could reduce the incidence 
and impact of workplace sexual harassment as a gendered harm.   
 
The Backfire Model Applied to Sexual Harassment 
According to the backfire model, when powerful individuals or groups behave in a way that 
others perceive as unjust, they are likely to attempt to dampen outrage by using one or more 
of the following five types of tactics: (1) cover up the action; (2) devalue the target; (3) 
reinterpret the events, by lying, framing or blaming; (4) use official channels to give an 
appearance of justice; and (5) intimidate or bribe people involved. When these methods fail, 
the action may backfire on the perpetrators, causing serious adverse consequences. 
Cover-up is common in SH, which often occurs in a one-on-one situation away from 
witnesses. Perpetrators seldom reveal their actions and targets often keep quiet because of 
shame or fear. Managers seldom publicise cases in their organisation, fearing bad publicity 
more than they anticipate benefits of deterring potential harassers. The counter-tactic to cover-
up is exposure, to friends, co-workers, managers, or the media. Often the most powerful 
exposure is directly to the harasser, letting them know their behaviour is unwelcome and 
constitutes harassment (Bingham & Scherer 1993; Firestone & Harris 1997; Langelan 1993).  
Devaluation of the target is also common in cases of SH, either openly and/or through 
rumours. This may involve derogatory labelling (e.g., ‘slut’, ‘poor sport’) or criticism of 
performance, such as claims about dishonesty, sloppiness or incompetence. Targets of 
harassment are often under intense scrutiny and perpetrators will often seize on any weakness 
to justify their position. The counter-tactic to devaluation is validation. This includes 
demonstrating good work performance, ethical behaviour, and good character, either by the 
target herself or, more effectively, by supporters, who are seen as less self-interested.  
Reinterpretation includes denying some of the actions, minimising their seriousness, and 
blaming others. Perpetrators may say that their comments were innocent or have been 
misunderstood and that their actions have been misinterpreted. For example, McDonald et al. 
(2008) found that where internal claims were lodged, often the perpetrator’s behaviour was 
minimised or excused as being understandable or justified. In a similar way, Charlesworth 
(2006) found that the most typical employer response to claims of discrimination was to 
dispute, reframe or rationalise the interpretation of the facts alleged by the complainant as due 
to poor performance, a ‘misunderstanding’ by the complainant or the consequence of external 
factors. The counter to reinterpretation is to present the original or obvious interpretation 
through a process of reframing, namely that inappropriate behaviour has occurred.  
Official channels include reports to senior officials, hotlines, grievance procedures, internal 
ombudsmen, formal inquiries, and appeals to external bodies, including professional 
organisations and courts. Most official channels emphasise formal processes, require 
confidentiality and focus on technicalities. Many of them are slow to respond. Despite the 
intentions of those running the procedures, the effect of many official channels is to dampen 
outrage: the immediacy and urgency of the problem is lost in the ponderous processes. In 
cases of SH, official channels are more likely to work against low-level perpetrators who do 
not have the support of organisational elites, and are less likely to be effective when the 
harasser has connections within the organisation (Hulin et al. 1996; Rowe 1996). The counter 
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to official channels is to avoid or discredit such processes, instead, mobilising support via 
personal contact, support groups, and publicity. In practice, targets and their supporters often 
use a dual-track strategy, both using official channels and mobilising support. 
Intimidation often takes the form of threats, open or implied, such as poor references, 
unwelcome job assignments, or dismissal. Bribery is a parallel process of promising 
favourable references, comfortable job assignments and promotions. These techniques are 
often used to encourage cover-up, discouraging action against harassment. Third parties, such 
as co-workers, may also be influenced by fear of reprisals or the promise of rewards. Terpstra 
(1997) refers to this form of harassment as quid pro quo harassment, where silence is 
rewarded and speaking out is penalised. Rewards include bonuses, pay increases, options of 
extra work, and promotion, while threats include withdrawal of annual leave, pay reductions, 
work hour restrictions and dismissal (McDonald et al. 2008). The counter to intimidation and 
bribery is resistance, which can discredit harassers by providing evidence of a threat.   
Scott and Martin (2006) used the backfire model to examine the 1991 case of Anita Hill who 
accused Clarence Thomas, then nominated to the US Supreme Court, of sexually harassing 
her. McDonald and Backstrom (2008) also used the framework to explore tactics in the first 
class-action SH case in the United States, depicted in the film North Country. Though the film 
is a dramatisation, it was useful in exploring the potential range of behaviours associated with 
SH because it portrays complex relationships and organisational structures. Evidence for all 
five methods of inhibiting outrage was found in these cases. However, the cases were 
spectacular ones, generating massive media attention. In contrast, we sought to determine 
whether the backfire framework applies as readily to less public examples. To do this, we 
selected lower-profile, legal cases with extensive documentation - an excellent resource for 
extending knowledge of the range of tactics and counter-tactics reported as evidence in SH 
cases and bridging the gap between single, high profile cases and those encountered in more 
everyday work settings. For our purposes, we did not judge the veracity of claims by the 
defendant or complainant; rather we examined the tactics used in the struggle between them. 
 
Methods 
We examined all Australian legal cases (N = 23) that satisfied the following conditions: 
1. Judgement was made in 2005 or 2006 with SH in the workplace as the central claim. 
2. The case was brought under federal or state sex discrimination legislation. 
3. The court report contained detailed information about facts, allegations, and evidence  
4. The case was a ‘principal matter’ and not an appeal, interlocutory injunction, 
application for extension of time, review of a decision, or a decision of costs. 
The cases were accessed online via the AustLII Databases, a public resource which provides 
links to all Commonwealth and State courts and tribunals. Of the 23 cases (21 female, 2 male 
complainants), 15 (65%) were successful and eight were dismissed. Fourteen of the 15 
successful cases were awarded financial compensation in the range of $AUS1,000 to $23,187 
(average $10,465, median $12,675). Only one-third of the successful cases had a judgment 
entered against the respondent to pay the applicant’s court costs. Those bringing a complaint 
to the court were more likely to have worked in a small workplace, often where the 
respondent was the employer. Twenty complainants were engaged in lower skilled 
occupations; the remaining three were state or federal government employees. Six 
complainants represented themselves in the legal proceedings. Four of these were dismissed, 
and one had the greater proportion of the claim dismissed with only partial substantiation. 
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Complaints across all cases commonly related to suggestive sexual comments and innuendo, 
unwanted physical touching, and exposure to pornographic images. 
In reading the text, we firstly searched for perpetrator tactics that were consistent with those 
in the backfire model. When a perpetrator tactic was identified, we then searched the text for 
evidence of counter-tactics (methods of resistance) used by complainants in response to these 
behaviours. By default, we also identified where counter-tactics were not typically evident in 
direct response to perpetrator tactics. In this way, a data set consisting of ten discrete 
perpetrator tactics and target counter-tactics was built up, as well as a picture of the relative 
effectiveness of these strategies in inhibiting outrage by the harasser on one hand, and 
mobilising support for the injustice by the complainant on the other. The tactics evident in the 
cases were retrospective in that they were descriptions provided in courtrooms about past 
events. However, we assumed a high degree of both accuracy and specificity in the details 
provided given the evidentiary requirements of court proceedings. 
As well as using the model to code the data, we also intended the data to inform the model. 
To this end, we actively searched for disconfirming data (Stake 1995), attempting to ascertain 
instances when tactics and counter-tactics were distinct from those in the a priori model. 
However, all strategies and responses were consistent with one of the 10 ‘cells’, lending 
support to the robustness of the model in circumstances where powerful individuals attempt to 
dampen outrage in response to unjust acts. Within each of the tactic and counter-tactic 
categories, relevant themes were identified. For example, incidences of devaluing tactics 
included questioning the credibility of the target, labelling them in a derogatory way, 
undermining their moral worth and insinuating poor work performance.  
 
Results 
Tactic One: Cover-up 
Cover-up was evident in the cases as operating in secrecy and through censorship. In two-
thirds of cases, the perpetrator operated in secrecy, with the majority of reported incidents 
occurring out of the public eye and when the complainant and respondent were alone. As a 
result, independent eyewitnesses to misconduct were rare. Illustrating secrecy, the respondent 
in Zhang v Kanellos stated during the proceedings, ‘Lucky the camera can only see my back’, 
and in Ferreira v Spanish Club, the applicant reported that the respondent had cornered her in 
a room and told her, ‘Who’s going to listen to you, we are alone’.  In some cases the 
perpetrator appeared to harass not only the complainant but a number of their co-workers. In 
Webb v Queensland, there was evidence that the perpetrator openly asked female staff 
members on dates, asked them for ‘hugs’ and made a practice of staring at their cleavage. The 
women came to a consensus that the perpetrator was the ‘office sleaze bag’. However, their 
view that the conduct was inappropriate and unwelcome was not communicated to the 
perpetrator himself, his co-workers, or anyone in authority. This silence, which was likely 
related to the power imbalance which often lies at ‘the fulcrum of assault and harassment’ 
(Easteal & Judd 2008: 337), facilitated the continued secrecy associated with the behaviours.  
Censorship, another form of cover-up, was identified in only one case, Wiggins v Defence, in 
which the Defence Department attempted to censor the complainant by advising her she was 
not to use work time and resources to seek information from other employees regarding the 
case. This hindered her efforts to collect supporting evidence for her case. 
 
Counter-Tactic One: Exposure 
In ten cases, the complainant resisted the harassment by making it known to the perpetrator 
that the conduct was not acceptable, and/or by exposing the harassment immediately to a 
supervisor or co-worker. However, a negative outcome of exposing the harassment was that 
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many complainants resigned from their positions immediately or shortly afterwards. In 
contrast to actively and openly exposing the harassment, 13 complainants chose not to 
confront the harasser, and/or delayed exposing the harassment to co-workers or managers. In 
Hodges v Queensland, the complainant stated in a meeting with her supervisor, ‘I haven’t 
reported it before now as I thought I could deal with it myself, but it is getting worse and now 
it has become physical’. This response is consistent with Conaghan’s (2004) assertion that 
those who complain have typically reached a point where the workplace disadvantages or 
detriment are sufficient to threaten or preclude their ongoing employment. Case descriptions 
revealed a number of reasons for targets remaining silent, including fear of losing their job 
(e.g., Ferreira v Spanish Club), feeling responsible for the harasser potentially losing their job 
(e.g., Hodges v Queensland), fear of the reactions of partners or co-workers (e.g., Collins v 
Fastlink), and a lack of assertiveness in confronting the harasser (e.g., San v Dirluck).  
 
Instead of confrontation, these complainants attempted to employ more subtle strategies to 
communicate that the harassers’ behaviours were unwanted. In Webb v Queensland, the 
complainant believed her body language (ignoring or leaving the room) had made it clear that 
the harasser’s behaviour was not welcome. In Ferreira v Spanish Club, the complainant did 
not confront the harasser initially when he tried to kiss her, but pushed him away and said she 
was going home. These findings suggest it is critical for targets of SH to effectively 
communicate opposition and concern, while managing the potential side-effects of disclosure. 
 
Tactic Two: Devaluation 
In 17 of the 23 cases, the perpetrator used devaluing tactics including questioning the 
credibility of the target or their motives for making reports, labelling the target in a derogatory 
way (e.g., as troublemaking or deceitful), questioning or undermining the moral worth of the 
individual, or insinuating poor work performance. Despite the range of devaluing tactics used, 
the prevalence of devaluation is likely understated given that spreading of rumours can 
seldom be documented. More than half of cases described tactics that undermined or 
questioned the credibility or motivations of the target, particularly by challenging 
inconsistencies in their version of events. In K v S & N, the respondent referred to a previous 
report of SH made by the complainant, alleging that she had deliberately embarked on a 
process of accusations from the commencement of her employment. An example of referring 
to inconsistencies was Ferreira v Spanish Club in which the target’s credibility was 
questioned by putting forward that she socialised with the perpetrator in the club after her 
shifts, which was argued to be incompatible with her account of SH. 
In San v Dirluck, the target was accused of swearing and making lewd references - the same 
behaviours of which the perpetrators had been accused. In Thompson v Courier, the target 
was accused of being a troublemaker, manipulative and deceitful. In Kassa and Bitmead, the 
complainant was painted as someone who was troublesome and overall, a difficult employee 
who argued with managers and other staff about her conditions of employment. In some 
instances, the moral worth of the target was questioned. For example in Zhang v Kanellos, the 
respondents presented evidence that the target had appeared in an article in FHM, a men’s 
magazine, wearing a bikini, with an interview on sexual topics. Such tactics are reminiscent 
of rape trials where admissibility of evidence of a victim’s lifestyle and sexual attitudes 
transforms it into a trial of the victim rather than the perpetrator (Fredman 1997). In three 
cases, the target’s credibility was undermined by alleging poor work performance. In Nguyen 
and Frederick, it was insinuated that the target was uncooperative, did poor work, was slow, 
and did not take instruction. The respondent argued that the motivation for raising the current 
SH claims was to divert attention away from her poor work performance.  
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Counter-Tactic Two: Validation 
Counter-tactics to devaluation included establishing credibility as a witness, posing a direct 
challenge to statements made by the perpetrator, and launching a counter-attack by finding 
and exposing negative information about the perpetrator. Surprisingly, in over 40 percent of 
cases where devaluation was used as a tactic, the complainant did not respond at all, and in 
some instances, agreed with what was presented. This lack of direct response to devaluation 
was harmful to some cases. For example, in K v S & N, the judge made mention of the target’s 
limitations in cross-examination due to self-representation, and her lack of questioning 
regarding discrediting statements by the perpetrator. In other cases though, being prepared to 
admit fault in certain areas had a positive effect in that it helped establish credibility as a 
witness. In San v Dirluck, where the target was accused of swearing and making lewd 
references in the workplace, the target in her evidence admitted that she did swear in the 
workplace and made other admissions against her interest. The judge in his summation found, 
‘Ms San answered the questions put to her in cross- examination carefully, with thought and 
consideration … she also made admissions against interest … I am prepared to accept her 
evidence … because I found her evidence credible’.  
In contrast, the complainant in Kassa and Bitmead denied all statements that denigrated her, 
and was not prepared to make any admissions, even though in some instances her position 
was contradicted by others, or not reconciled with her own claims. She instead brought 
forward witnesses who testified that the perpetrator was a ‘womaniser’ and had sexually 
harassed others in the workplace. She also claimed that the culture of the organisation was 
one of sexual innuendo, sexual relationships and exploitation by managers of the mostly 
immigrant employees. The judge in his summation stated he believed she had not been 
truthful about some matters and was not satisfied that she was a credible witness.  
Compared with discrediting the respondent, a more successful counter-tactic to devaluation 
was to directly challenge the negative statements. In Thompson v Courier, the organisation 
painted the employee as a liar and troublemaker who intimidated co-workers, resisted 
weekend work and manipulated procedures to her advantage. The complainant, in response, 
challenged the label of troublemaker by asserting that it had only been used after she made 
formal written complaints. She also asserted that she was reluctant to work on Saturdays due 
to religious beliefs. Further, she produced witnesses who agreed she was assertive, but that 
management resented this and therefore singled her out for intimidatory treatment.  
 
Tactic Three: Reinterpretation 
Tactics identified in this category included denying the facts, construing actions as friendly, 
innocent, or misunderstood, interpreting the target’s responses as reciprocating or 
encouraging the behaviour, and attesting harm to be non-existent or less than claimed. With 
respect to construing actions, statements were given such as ‘We were only joking’ (San v 
Dirluck), ‘Everybody in the room laughed’ (Hewett v Davies), and ‘There was a 
misunderstanding of behaviour, or misinterpretation of body language’ (Webb v Queensland). 
In Brown v Richmond, the respondent admitted he did try to kiss the complainant, but in an 
innocent manner as one would kiss a friend on the cheek before leaving.  
Another type of reinterpretation was claiming that harm to the target was non-existent or less 
than claimed. In Gabryelczyk v Hundt, the target was told by the perpetrator, ‘It’s all character 
building’. Several cases also involved claims of management dismissing or explaining away 
sexually harassing behaviour. In Hodges v Queensland, for example, a supervisor responded 
to an internal complaint with the comment, ‘Boys will be boys’. In some cases, the 
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respondents signalled the target’s responses as reciprocating or encouraging the behaviour. 
For example, in San v Dirluck, the target admitted the workplace was permeated with the use 
of strong swearing, slang, and jocularity and that she herself swore regularly at work. The 
respondent claimed therefore, that any sexual conversations he had with the complainant 
could not be unwanted. In many cases, the details of sexually harassing incidents were simply 
denied, sometimes with no alternative explanation offered. Where there were no witnesses to 
the event, it was simply one person’s word against another.  
 
Counter-Tactic Three: Reframing  
Tactics identified as reframing included documenting the harassment and its consequences, 
corroboration from witnesses to support the original interpretation, providing evidence to 
support the claim, use of independent experts and rebutting the reinterpretation. Noting dates, 
times, details of behaviours and the consequences of actions was critical. Evidence included 
notes from diaries and meetings, photos, emails and written formal complaints to supervisors. 
If a target had both documentary evidence and a clear recollection of details, this led to 
stronger credibility as a witness. Conversely, complainants who had difficulty recalling 
sequences of events were often unsuccessful. As the judge in Frith v Exchange noted, 
‘Recollection is notoriously unreliable’. The emphasis on documenting events at an early 
stage for later evidential purposes is a critical strategy for targets, but occurs uncommonly. 
Most women’s initial reactions to harassment is to pretend it is not happening (Hunter 2002). 
Another significant reframing counter-tactic available to targets is having corroboration from 
witnesses. Witnesses included relatives or friends who had been informed of the incidents 
immediately after they occurred, and co-workers who experienced similar behaviour or who 
witnessed the alleged incidents. Corroboration is especially important in the face of strong 
denials from perpetrators. In San v Dirluck, the judge stated, ‘I am prepared to accept her 
evidence … because I found her evidence credible and more importantly it was corroborated 
…’ Other cases were unsuccessful because the complainant had no corroborating evidence to 
refute the respondents’ denials. The use of independent experts to support reframing was also 
important for claims to proceed successfully. This expertise included medical reports from 
general practitioners, psychologists or psychiatrists. In Gabryelczyk v Hundt, the complainant 
produced medical reports testifying to the treatment received for the psychological effects of 
the harassment. This strategy lent weight to the target’s interpretation of events.  
 
Tactic Four: Official Channels 
In 13 of the 23 cases, the complainant used official organisational channels to attempt to stop 
the alleged harassment. As a result, respondents typically claimed the issue had been dealt 
with through formal organisational procedures and consequently, justice had been served. In 
Hodges v Queensland, the target accused a regional hospital of a lack of response and of not 
providing adequate support to her. In response, the organisation denied responsibility because 
the complainant refused to submit a formal written complaint, instead reporting the 
harassment during a meeting. The judge decided that although in all probability she had been 
sexually harassed, the complainant failed to establish breach of duty of care by the hospital 
because she chose not to use the clearly established systems for dealing with harassment. In 
other cases, respondents relied on official policies and procedures to argue that the alleged 
conduct could not, or would have been highly unlikely, to have occurred. In Thompson v 
Courier, the target reported that she was exposed to pornographic images and accused the 
organisation of allowing their employees unrestricted access to the internet which enabled the 
sharing and viewing of such material. The organisation argued in response that it had 
restricted staff access to the internet immediately after it became aware that employees were 
accessing adult sites. The complainant’s manager stated he was not aware of pornographic 
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images being shown on computer screens after this date, and that if he had, he would have 
used official organisational channels to put a stop to it. 
Another variation on the use of official channels was to use clean employment histories as 
evidence that it was unlikely that the alleged perpetrator could have engaged in sexually 
harassing behaviour. In Wiggins v Defence, the organisation put forward untainted past 
performance evaluations as evidence that wrongdoing was extremely unlikely: ‘Nowhere is 
any reference made in any of the reports to any form of discriminatory behaviour’.  
 
Counter-Tactic Four: Challenge Official Channels 
Arguing against the official channels tactics described in the previous section, complainants 
attempted to discredit and show the failings of these systems and/or challenge the motivations 
of the people who were responsible for using them. Complainants in four cases told how 
internal organisational procedures were of little or no use to them, did not treat complaints 
seriously or investigate them adequately, or were ineffectual in taking reasonable steps to 
prevent further harassment. For example, in Thompson v Courier, where the target was 
exposed to pornographic images, the organisation denied any failure. In response, the target 
produced a memo containing the computer passwords of 18 employees who could freely 
access the internet. This directly challenged the organisation’s claims that it had taken 
measures to restrict internet access.  
It was also asserted by some complainants who worked in larger organisations that staff were 
not properly inducted or trained in the issue of SH. In Hodges v Queensland, for example, the 
target pointed out in her statement that she didn’t report the harassment initially because she 
didn’t know to whom to report it. When she did find a nominated person, she was informed 
this was the first case of harassment they had dealt with. In contrast to larger organisations 
which often provided evidence of the systems in place to deal with SH, in smaller 
organisations there were fewer procedures for targets to utilise. For example, in San v 
Dirluck, the organisation, a butcher shop, was criticised for its lack of response. The 
complainant explained how her supervisor advised her not to let it get to her, to ignore the 
remarks, or say something smart in return. Compounding the problem of lack of official 
organisational channels, in five cases involving very small organisations, the harasser was the 
employer, negating any opportunity for a target to complain using internal systems.  
 
Tactic Five: Intimidation/Bribery 
Around three-quarters of the cases involved intimidation or bribery. Tactics identified in this 
category include threats of reprisals, physically intimidating behaviour, intimidation of 
witnesses, ostracism or victimisation, and the offer of incentives to remain silent. Threats of 
reprisals occurred in over half the cases, including job loss and reductions in work hours or 
pay. In all cases, targets reported feeling isolated and segregated. In Brown v Richmond, the 
complainant was demoted, her performance criticised, and there was an attempt to change her 
hours of work. Details of physical threats were not uncommon. In Dale v Shearer, the target 
was physically restrained in a room and told by the perpetrator she would be released only 
after she gave him a hug. In Gabryelczyk v Hundt, the complainant kicked the harasser after 
she was subjected to unwanted physical touching and was told, ‘If I get a black eye I will 
punch you in the face and give you one because I am going out tonight with my wife’.  
 
Counter-Tactic Five: Resistance 
There were relatively few examples of resistance to intimidation and bribery. The backfire 
framework suggests such actions include exposing, standing up to, or documenting the 
intimidation and bribery. This is in contrast to exposing the harassment itself. The scarcity of 
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this response may in part be due to the small organisational environments in which many of 
the targets were employed and where it was difficult to expose intimidation and encourage 
outrage amongst others. In two cases, complainants who had been physically threatened 
sought an apprehended violence order against the harasser. In Gabryelczyk v Hundt, one of 
only two male-to-male cases, the target’s mother had phoned her son’s supervisor about signs 
of physical abuse to him. A few weeks later, the target, an apprentice electrician, resigned. 
Wiggins v Defence was the only case where the target was able to provide documentary 
evidence of intimidation by the respondent or the organisation, producing a letter instructing 
her not to use company time to seek information about her case.  
 
Discussion 
Using 23 Australian cases, we found evidence of a wide range of perpetrator tactics and target 
counter-tactics. These tactics can be readily fitted into the backfire framework, which 
proposes that powerful perpetrators of perceived unjust acts are likely to cover up the actions, 
devalue the target, reinterpret the events, use official channels to give an appearance of 
justice, and intimidate or bribe people involved. Targets can respond using, respectively, 
counter-tactics of exposure, validation, reframing, mobilisation of support, and resistance. 
Despite active searching, we did not uncover any tactics falling outside the framework. 
Courts are prime official channels, given their social credibility. According to the backfire 
model, going to court over a SH matter is likely to reduce the prospect of public outrage. The 
cases examined received a modicum of publicity via court proceedings, but arguably far less 
than might have been achieved by a modest campaign to circulate information at the 
workplace or more widely. Few women are willing to go to court over SH, even today with 
the relative benefit of a body of case law and a more understanding and supportive 
community. The damages awarded in the cases examined (around A$10,000 on average) were 
relatively small given the financial and psychological costs involved, including loss of 
employment. Complainants who represented themselves were far less likely to be successful, 
suggesting that legal representation is critical, but with the disadvantage of significant 
financial costs. Assistance with legal representation in such a technical area of law is often 
inadequate because individuals are commonly opposed by well-resourced corporate players 
(Gaze 2004). Indeed, the legal route tends to be daunting and expensive, with a low return. 
Further, Murray (2005) argues that the use of anti-discrimination legislation in a legal 
jurisdiction is individualistic and has little visibility to the citizen-observer, except in rare or 
unusual cases where the case is a particularly high-profile. This is compatible with the 
backfire model, in which using official channels is more likely to dampen outrage.  
Target responses to sexual harassment in the cases examined generally proceeded from 
initially passive, such as avoiding the harasser or using body language to communicate 
unwanted behaviour, to more assertive responses as the harassment escalated and became 
more frequent or intimidating. This confirms findings that targets of SH are more likely to 
report the harassment or confront the perpetrator if the harassment is severe (Cochrane et al. 
1997; Stockdale et al. 1996), such as sexual assault or solicitation of sexual activity. While 
passivity in the early stages is understandable because the targets wish to avoid conflict or 
feared job-related consequences, such a response is often ineffective. 
Those who reported SH through internal channels experienced a widespread failure of these 
systems, including the failure to investigate complaints, treat complaints seriously, train staff 
adequately, or take reasonable steps to prevent further harassment. Importantly, organisations 
should be aware that the making of a formal, written complaint is not a pre-condition to the 
requirement of an employer to take action to prevent harassment. If management is aware, 
through observation or another source, that a situation of actual or potential SH exists, it is 
McDonald & Graham 
obligated to act in the absence of a complaint. Compounding the problem of ineffectual 
organisational responses was the number of cases involving smaller workplaces where the 
harasser was also the employer and where few opportunities were available for assistance to 
be enlisted. Indeed, this and other studies (e.g., Knapp et al. 1997) reveal that the smaller the 
organisation, the more likely the perpetrator is to be the owner or supervisor, and the less 
likely the target is to report the behaviour. Hence, while it is desirable that all organisations 
respond more appropriately to complaints from individual targets, in very small workplaces, 
effective individual-level responses may be the only means of attempting to stop the 
harassment prior to seeking formal legal redress.  
The backfire framework contributes to an understanding of the way SH typically occurs in 
organisations, beyond its underlying causes, and could be utilised for the development of 
more targeted organisational policies designed to change the structures which support SH. For 
example, the framework could be used to develop employee training modules which 
incorporate the types of tactics often used by harassers and a range of appropriate responses to 
internal complaints of SH (McDonald & Backstrom, 2008). Greater awareness of specific 
behaviours associated with SH would also assist employees to recognise behaviours which 
warrant action in the first place. As Felstiner et al. (1980-1981) notes, for employees to be 
able to make a formal complaint, they first need to name or ‘see’ an action or experience as 
detrimental or discriminatory. Further, the backfire framework could have practical 
application to other pervasive, sex-based discriminatory practices in organisations (e.g., 
pregnancy discrimination) that affect the work and life opportunities of women. Generally, 
potential targets of harassment - nearly everyone in principle - should be aware of the 
methods likely to be used to reduce outrage and be cognisant of appropriate responses, 
including exposure, validation, reframing, mobilising support, and resistance to intimidation. 
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